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Abstract: This paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies in
which asset markets arise as choice of financial intermediaries. The economy is
modeled as a two stage game as in Bisin[8]. In the first stage intermediaries set
up the financial structure according to the expectation that they have for the sec-
ond stage outcome. In the second stage, consumers behave as price takers in the
commodity market and in the previously created assets market. We consider that
intermediaries form their expectations using continuous random selections from
the second stage equilibrium correspondence (differently from Bisin [8] where an
endogenous beliefs expectation was used). We establish the existence of equilibria
in mixed strategies and moreover, we obtain an approximate equilibria in pure
strategies by modeling explicitly the incomplete information that each interme-
diary has about others intermediaries fixed cost functions.
Key words: Endogenous asset creation, asset design game, strategic inter-
mediaries, continuous random selections, purification of equilibria.
JEL Classification: G20, D51.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the general equilibrium models with exogenously given financial markets, the
properties of final allocations depend on the fixed structure of these assets. Our
purpose is to provide a model where the asset structure arises endogenously as
choice of economic agents. This issue was already studied in the literature and the
papers by Allen and Gale [5], Duffie and Jackson [12], Duffie and Rahi [13], Hara
[22] and Pesendorfer [29] constitute the first references to this topic. Nevertheless,
the more general framework was developed in the paper by Bisin [8].
In Bisin [8], the economy is composed by two kind of agents, intermediaries
that are imperfectly competitive and consumers that are price takers. The inter-
mediaries design the payoff of the securities that they issue and choose the spread
they charge on each security in order to maximize profits. A fixed cost and a pro-
portional transaction cost are required to intermediate each security. Equilibrium
prices are fixed by a Walrasian auctioneer to clear the spot and security markets
and prices and demands are rationally anticipated by intermediaries. Then, the
intermediaries are able to evaluate their profit for each financial structure, there-
fore, they are able to choose the financial structure that gives them an optimal
profit. Using this setup Bisin obtains the existence of equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies.
The framework of our work follows the setup of Bisin. However, we take up
a different approach to solve the model. Besides, we obtain, not just the exis-
tence of equilibrium in mixed strategies, but also the existence of an approximate
equilibrium in pure strategies. We remark that our tool can be applied also in
other approaches, for instance, exchange economies where assets are designed by
consumers. The models of Braido[9] and Faias[PhD diss] are examples of this
class of economies.
In Bisin [8] and in this work the behavior of the intermediaries is modelled by
a game. In this game the intermediaries maximize their expected payoff functions
anticipating the Walrasian prices. Our model diverges from the model of Bisin
in the way how the intermediaries form the expectations. More precisely, Bisin
uses admissible beliefs and the Nash equilibrium existence results for games with
upper-hemicontinuous profit correspondences due to Simon-Zame [32]. We use
the random selection technique introduced by Allen [3] and explored by Mas-
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Colell and Nachbar [27], Allen [4] and Stahn [33] in models of imperfect competi-
tion in complete markets. We show the existence of a continuous random selection
in the Walrasian equilibrium correspondence which implies the continuity of each
player’s payoff function. From this continuity we obtain the equilibrium in mixed
strategies for the asset creation game. However, another important consequence
of this continuity is that we can go one step further and obtain a pure strat-
egy solution by explicitly modelling intermediaries’ incomplete information with
respect to competitors’ fixed cost functions, within a family of linear functions
of the mean and variance of the asset return. We apply the results of Milgrom
and Weber [28], to get the existence of equilibrium in distributional strategies.
Finally, exploring the Liapunov convexification theorem, we obtain the generic
existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies (which associates to
each type a pure strategy).
The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in section 2. In
section 3 we define the equilibrium concept and present the result of existence of
equilibrium. In section 4 we introduce incomplete information and establish the
existence of distributional strategy equilibrium and the generic existence of an
approximate equilibrium in pure strategies.
2 THE ECONOMY
The model has two stages with two periods in the second stage, t = 0, 1. Uncer-
tainty on the states of nature over the period 1 is denoted by s ∈ S = 1, 2, . . . , S.
There are l = 1, . . . , L commodities in each periods and state. Let n = (S + 1)L
be the number of states and time contingent goods of the economy.
Consumers.
Each consumer i, for i = 1, . . . , I is characterized by an utility function ui :
IRn+ −→ IR and by an initial endowment vector wi = (wi0, wi1, . . . , wiS) ∈ IRn+.
We state the following assumptions for the utility functions:
(A.1) ui is twice differentiable, Dui >> 0, and D
2ui is negative definite on IR
n
++.
(A.2) The closure of each indifference curve of ui does not intersect the boundary
of IRn++.
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(A.3) ui is monotonic in commodity 1(s) for each s ∈ S: Let x˜ be any consumption
plan that is nonnegative in every coordinate, and strictly positive at 1(s)
for some s ∈ S. Then for all x ∈ IRn++, ui(x+ x˜) > ui(x).
Intermediaries.
We consider that in this economy there are h = 1, . . . , H intermediaries who
design assets and provide financial transactions. These designers are alive only
at period 0, are endowed with the good 1 and have utility just on this good.
Each security in the economy is characterized by a payoff vector a = (a1, . . . , aS),
where as for each state of nature s is a numeraire return denominated in units
of good 1. We assume that each intermediary can issue at most Jh assets, which
is an exogenous given number. Let J =
H∑
h=1
Jh and let aj, j = 1, ..., J denote
the tradable assets in the economy. To create an asset the intermediary have
to pay fixed issuing costs, and transaction costs, and obtain as return a bid-ask
spread. For any asset a ∈ IRS, the functions ε(a) and c(a) denote respectively
variable costs and fixed costs associated to the creation of the asset a, and both
are denominated in units of commodity 1. We state the following assumptions
for the cost functions:
(B.1) ε(a), c(a) ≥ 0;= 0 iff a = 0.
(B.2) ε(a), c(a) are, respectively, homogenous of degree 1 and 0 in a.
(B.3) ε(a), c(a) are twice differentiable.
Assumption (B.2) means that issuing two identical assets with payoff a has the
same total cost of issuing one asset with payoff 2a. We assume that the return of
each asset in each state of nature is nonnegative, that is, aj(s) ≥ 0 for j = 1, ..., J
and s = 1, ..., S. The assumption (B.2) implies that without loss of generality,
the set of securities payoff can be normalized to:
A = {a ∈ IRS+ : max
s∈S
a(s) = 1 or a(s) = 0, for all s ∈ S}.
The asset return structure is then represented by a matrix A = {aj(s)}j∈Js∈S which
is a S × J matrix with A ∈ AJ = A× · · · × A
(J times)
. Given an asset structure A we
denote by Jˆ the maximal number of independent columns of this matrix, that
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is, the minimal number of assets that span the space spanned by this financial
structure.
The bid-ask spread for each asset a is described by a non linear function
that we assume with the form G(γ)(z) = γz2. The bid ask spread function is
the same for all assets apart from the parameter γ which is also a choice of the
intermediary that design the asset. We assume that the spread parameter γ is
chosen in a certain set of admissible spread parameters that, as in Bisin, we
suppose compact. Let the set of admissible spread parameters be Γ = [γ, γ], in
the strictly positive axis. Since γ > 0, by taking this spread function, we are
assuming that the bid-ask spread on each asset is an increasing function of the
quantity of the asset that is transacted. We also remark that since G(γ)(z) > 0
if z 6= 0, then when a consumer buys an asset he pays more than its market price
and when a consumer sells an asset he receives less than its market price. Spreads
are also denominated in units of good 1.
These costs and this spread describe the technology that is available to create
the asset markets structure in this economy.
We consider that the intermediary just have endowment and gets utility from
the good 1 of the first period. The purpose of the intermediaries will be to
maximize profits, that is, to maximize the difference between the spread and
the costs of the asset. We denote by z = (z1, ..., zJ) a portfolio of assets in this
economy and by z+ = (z+1, ..., z+J) the corresponding portfolio of asset purchases.
The payoff of the intermediary h associated with a portfolio z is:
pih =
Jh∑
j=1
[G(γj)(zj)− ε(aj)(z+j)− c(aj)].
2.1 The Economy with an Asset Market Structure Fixed.
Suppose that an economy {(ui, wi); i ∈ I}, a vector of spread parameters γ and
an asset return structure A are fixed. Then, given (p0, p1, q) ∈ IRn+ + IRJ , the
utility maximization problem of the consumers is:
max
x∈IRn+,z∈IRJ
ui(x)
s.a. p0(x0 − wi0) + p01G(γ)(z) + qz = 0
ps(xs − wis) = p1sa(s)z for all x ∈ IRn+, z ∈ IRJ ,
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where G(γ)(z) =
J∑
j=1
G(γj)(zj).
Definition 1. A Walrasian equilibrium for a given vector of spread parameters γ
and for a given asset return structure A is a collection (p¯0, p¯1, q¯, (x¯
i, z¯i)i∈I , (x¯h)h∈H) ∈
IRn+ × IRJ × (IRn+ × IRJ)I × IRH such that:
(a) For every consumer i, (x¯i, z¯i) solves the consumer problem.
(b) For every intermediary h, x¯h =
Jh∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
[G(γj)(z¯
i
j)− ε(aj)z¯ij − c(aj)] + wh.
(c) Markets clear,
I∑
i=1
(x¯i10 − wi10) +
H∑
h=1
(x¯h − wh) +
J∑
j=1
[ε(aj)(
I∑
i=1
z¯ij) + c(aj)] = 0
For all l 6= 1,
I∑
i=1
(x¯il0 − wil0) = 0
For all s,
I∑
i=1
(x¯is − wis) = 0
I∑
i=1
z¯i = 0.
Lemma 1. If assumptions A.1.−A.3. and B.1.−B.3. are satisfied, there exist a
Walrasian equilibrium for a given vector of spread parameters γ and for a given
asset return structure A.
The main theorem of the next section requires that the aggregate demand
function be continuously differentiable. The S + 1 occurrences of the walras law
allow us to drop S+1 markets, and if one of that markets is precisely the market
of the commodity 1 in the first period then the aggregate excess demand function
in the remaining markets can be written has:
f(w, γ,A, p0, p1, q) = (x(w, γ,A, p0, p1, q), z(w, γ,A, p0, p1, q))− (
∑
i∈I
wi, 0).
Lemma 2. If assumptions (A.1)−(A.3) and (B.1)−(B.3) are satisfied, individual
demand is a C1 function.
By homogeneity in prices we can take as the set of prices the simplex ∆(L−1)S ×
∆L+J−1 with ∆L−1 = {p(s) ∈ IRL+ :
∑
l∈ÃL
pl(s) = 1} and ∆L+J−1 = {(p0, q) ∈ IRL+J+ :
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∑
l∈L,j∈J
p0l + qj = 1}. Therefore the excess demand function f(w, γ,A, p0, p1, q) is
a C1 function in the interior of the price set ∆(L−1)S ×∆L+J−1.
2.2 Asset Creation.
At the first stage of the model each intermediary strategically chooses the payoff
structure and the spread parameter of some pre-fixed number of assets. The in-
termediaries have rational expectations which mean that they correctly anticipate
the equilibrium price set corresponding to each vector of spread parameters and
to each payoff matrix, therefore the intermediaries know the corresponding set of
payoffs. The goal of the intermediaries is to choose the vector of spread parame-
ters and the payoff matrix that maximizes their individual payoff. However, if we
consider that intermediaries evaluate their payoffs through this correspondence,
we face a difficulty because this correspondence is not continuous. To overcome
this problem, we apply the random selections technique which was developed by
Allen [3], Mas-Collel and Nachbar [27] and H. Stahn [33].
The equilibrium correspondence which maps a vector of spread parameters γ
and a matrix A into the related set of Walrasian prices that arises in the second
stage of the economy, is defined using the aggregate demand function as follows:
E : ΓJ ×AJ −→ 2∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1
with
E(γ,A) = {(p0, p1, q) ∈ ∆(L−1)S ×∆L+J−1 : f(w, γ,A, p0, p1, q) = 0}.
This correspondence is not continuous essentially due to jumps in the cardi-
nality of the equilibrium set. If we adopt the random selections technique, this
problem disappears. In fact, if one has in mind that the selection represents
the inherent uncertainty about the market clearing price levels, we can assume
that each consumer assigns a zero probability to a price level on a fold (unstable
structure) because any small mistake in the price observation can lead to drastic
errors in the evaluation of the indirect utility, i.e., in evaluating the payoffs.
Following the approach of Mas-Collel and Nachbar [27] the main tool to ob-
tain a continuous random selection in the equilibrium is the Michael selection
theorem . The Michael selection theorem states that a correspondence from a
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paracompact space to a complete, metrizable, locally convex, linear space, which
is lower hemicontinuous and takes (non-empty) closed and convex values admits
a continuous selection [see C. Aliprantis and K. Border [1]]. We will consider
the subcorrespondence of quasi-regular equilibrium (this concept will be defined
later) and prove that this subcorrespondence verifies the Michael selection the-
orem, then the subcorrespondence admits a continuous random selection which,
actually, is a continuous random selection of the equilibrium correspondence E.
We start by proving that for a residual economy the equilibrium correspondence
E maps each vector of spread parameters and payoff matrix into a countable
set. This result is essential to prove that the equilibrium subcorrespondence is
non-empty.
Given an asset structure A, we split the payoff matrix, A = [Aˆ|Aˆc], where
Aˆ is the submatrix of A with the maximal number of independent columns and
Aˆc is the submatrix with the remaining columns. We are considering that the
columns of the matrix are ordered in such a way that the first columns are in-
dependent. The columns of Aˆc are in the space generated by the columns of
Aˆ, then, there exist a matrix B such that Aˆc = AˆB. Thus, given a portfolio
vector z = (zˆ1, zˆ2) = (z1, . . . , zJˆ , zJˆ+1, . . . , zJ), we define the adjusted portfolio
Jˆ-dimensional as zˆ = zˆ1 + Bzˆ2. It follows that, we can obtain the return vector
Az as the product between the payoff matrix Aˆ and the adjusted portfolio zˆ, that
is, Az = [Aˆ|Aˆc][zˆ1zˆ2]′ = Aˆ[zˆ1 +Bzˆ2] = Aˆzˆ.
Let fˆ(w, γ,A, p0, p1, q) be the aggregate demand function, where the aggre-
gate portfolio is replaced by the aggregate adjusted portfolio. Let Eˆ(γ,A) =
{(p0, p1, q) ∈ ∆(L−1)S × ∆L+J−1 : fˆ(w, γ,A, p0, p1, q) = 0}, then E(γ,A) ⊆
Eˆ(γ,A). We first show that the number of equilibra in Eˆ(γ,A) is countable,
hence, we conclude that the number of equilibria in E(γ,A) is at most countable.
An equilibrium price (p0, p1, q) is a regular (resp. critical) equilibrium if
fˆ(w,A, γ, p0, p1, q) = 0 and rank Dp0,p1,qfˆ(w,A, γ, p0, p1, q) = (L− 1)(S + 1) + Jˆ
(resp. < (L− 1)(S + 1)) + Jˆ).
The next result states that the number of critical equilibria in Eˆ(γ,A) is finite
for a residual set of utility functions and endowments of commodity l = L for
Jˆ states of one of the consumers. Thus, we have to perturb the utility function
of one of the consumers [as in Mas-Colell and Nachbar [27]] but we have also
to perturb the endowments of one consumer (in at least as many states as the
9
number of assets) in one of the commodities.
Let us denote by U the space of utility functions of each consumer and endow
the space with the topology of C∞ uniform convergence on compacta. It is then
topologically complete and, therefore, residual subsets (i.e., sets containing the
intersection of a countable collection of open dense sets) are dense.
For the next results the utility of the first consumer will be perturbed, thus,
we fix all the utility functions u2, ..., uI of consumers i = 2, ..., I. Since we will
perturb the endowment of the first consumer in the last good for Jˆ states of
nature, we split the endowment vector of the consumers, w = (w1
LJˆ
, w1−LJˆ) where
w1
LJˆ
= (w1L(s))
Jˆ
s=1 ∈ IRJˆ+ is the endowment in the commodity L of the first
consumer but just for the first Jˆ states of nature of the second period, and
w1−LJˆ ∈ IR
L(1+S−Jˆ)+(L−1)Jˆ+n(I−1)
+ enclose the remaining endowment vector of the
consumers, namely, the remaining endowment vector of the first consumer (the
endowment of the first period and the endowment of the last S − Jˆ states of
nature of the second period in all commodities and the endowments of the states
s = 1, ..., Jˆ in the goods 1 to L−1), and the total endowment vectors of consumers
i = 2, ..., I.
The method of prove that we can find in [in Faias, Moreno-Garcia and Pa´scoa
[16], Proposition 4.1.] and [Mas-Collel-Nachbar, [27], Proposition 1] when adapted
to our context implies the following result.
Proposition 1. There is a set U∗ ×W∗
LJˆ
residual in U × IRJˆ+ such that for an
economy {(ui)i∈I , (w1LJˆ , w1−LJˆ), (uh, wh)h∈H , γ, A} with u1 ∈ U∗, w1LJˆ ∈ W∗LJˆ and
with an exogenous vector of spread parameters γ ∈ ΓJ and an exogenous asset
market given by the payoff matrix A ∈ AJ the number of critical equilibria in
Eˆ(γ,A) is at most nI + SJ + J .
The Inverse Function Theorem guarantees that regular equilibria are locally
isolated. Therefore the number of equilibria in Eˆ(γ,A) is at most countable.
Since, E(γ,A) ⊆ Eˆ(γ,A), we can state the required result.
Corollary 1. There is a set U∗ × W∗
LJˆ
residual in U × IRJˆ+ such that for an
economy {(ui)Ii=1, (w1LJˆ , w1−LJˆ), A, γ} with u1 ∈ U∗, w1LJˆ ∈ W∗LJ and with an
exogenous vector of spread parameters γ ∈ Γ and an exogenous asset market
given by the payoff matrix A ∈ A, the number of equilibria for the economy is at
most countable.
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Let P(∆(L−1)S × ∆L+J−1) be the set of probabilities measures on ∆(L−1)S ×
∆L+J−1.
Definition 2. A continuous random selection of E is a function ρ : ΓJ ×AJ −→
P(∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1), such that: (i) for all (γ,A) ∈ ΓJ×AJ , ρ(γ,A)(E(γ,A)) = 1
and (ii) ρ is continuous, that is, if (γn, An) −→ (γ,A) then ρ(γn, An) −→ ρ(γ,A)
for the topology of weak convergence.
Definition 3. An equilibrium point (p0, p1, q) of E(γ,A) is a quasi-regular equi-
librium if for any ε > 0 there exists some closed ball Bε ⊂ ∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1, cen-
tered at (p0, p1, q) and of radius less then ε, such that the degree of f(w, γ,A, ., ., .)
restricted to ∂Bε is well defined (i.e., 0 /∈ f(w, γ,A, ∂Bε) and non-zero. [By de-
gree of f(w, γ,A, ., ., .) on ∂Bε we mean the degree of the map
(p0, p1, q) −→ [1/‖f(w, γ,A, p0, p1, q)‖]f(w, γ,A, p0, p1, q)
viewed as a map of the sphere into itself.]
Definition 4. We denote by E ′ the subcorrespondence of the equilibrium corre-
spondence E which maps ΓJ ×AJ into the quasi-regular equilibria, that is,
E ′(γ,A) = {(p0, p1, q) ∈ ∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1 : f(w, γ,A, p0, p1, q) = 0 and (p0, p1, q)
is a quasi-regular equilibrium }.
Proposition 2. If for every (γ,A) ∈ ΓJ ×AJ , E(γ,A) is at most countable than
there exists a continuous random selection in the equilibrium correspondence E.
Proof: To prove this proposition, actually we will prove the existence of a
continuous random selection for the subcorrespondence E ′, but this result trivially
implies the existence of a continuous random selection to the correspondence E.
The prove follows with three claims.
First claim: E ′(A) is non empty.
By Cass trick [see Geanakoplos [18] and Magill and Shafer [25]] we can con-
sider, without loss of generality, that the problem of one of the consumers is a
problem with complete markets. Precisely, regarding commodities demand func-
tions, we can consider that the budget constraint for such a consumer is defined by
p0(x0−w0) +
∑
s
p˜s(xs−ws) = 0, being p˜s = βsps and pib =
∑
s
βsr
b(s), for some
β À 0. In this way, we have that if (p0n, p1n, qn) is a sequence of prices belonging
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to E(γ,A) and converging to (p0, p1, q), then the price system (p0, p1, q) has every
component non null. We conclude that E(γ,A) is a compact set. Since we have
also proved that E(γ,A) is at most countable, it can be covered by finite many
disjoint open balls Bk, k = 1, ..., K, such that their closure are non-intersecting,
[see Mas-Collel, Nachbar, [27], lemma 6].
On the other hand, we can take a set (diffeomorfic to a ball) close enough
to the boundary of ∆(L−1)S ×∆L+J−1, where f(w, γ,A, ., ., .) does not change its
orientation and therefore f(w, γ,A, ., ., .) has degree different from zero on such a
set. Now we can take a sequence of balls Bn with radius strictly decreasing and
converging to zero and such that f(w, γ,A, ., ., .) is well defined on ∂Bn and has
non-zero degree. Thus ∩Bn consists of a single point which by construction is a
quasi-regular equilibrium, [see Mas-Collel Nachbar, [27], lemma 7].
Second claim: The correspondence E ′ : ΓJ × AJ −→ 2∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1 is lower
hemicontinuous.
Fix some arbitrary (γ,A) ∈ ΓJ×AJ and take a sequence γn×An. If (p0, p1, q)
is a quasi-regular zero of E(γ,A) then for any ε > 0 no matter small, there is a ball
Bε centered at (p0, p1, q) and of radius then ε such that f(w, γ,A, ., ., .) restricted
to ∂Bε is of non-zero degree. By continuity, for n large enough, f(w, γn, An, ., ., .)
is homotopic to f(w, γ,A, ., ., .) on ∂Bε, hence f(w, γn, An, ., ., .) has non zero
degree on ∂Bε. By the boundary theorem [see Hirsch [24], p.136] there exist
a (p0n, p1n, qn) such that f(w, γn, An, p0n, p1n, qn) = 0 and then (p0n, p1n, qn) is a
quasi-regular zero of f(w, γn, An, ., ., .). Of course, ‖(p0n, p1n, qn)−(p0, p1, q)‖ < ε.
Since ε is arbitrary we are done.
Let us now consider the correspondence E ′′ : ΓJ ×AJ −→ 2P(∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1)
which applies each payoff matrix and spread parameter into a set of probabilities
measures, E ′′(γ,A) ⊂ P(∆(L−1)S × ∆L+J−1) with each measure ρ ∈ E ′′(γ,A)
verifying that ρ(E ′(γ,A)) = 1.
Third claim: The correspondence E ′′ is lower hemicontinuous.
Let (γn, An) −→ (γ,A) and let ρ ∈ E ′′(γ,A). Fix an arbitrary ε > 0. Choose
a finite set {(p01, p11, q1), ..., (p0m, p1m, qm)} ⊂ E ′′(γ,A) with
ρ((p01, p11, q1), ..., (p0m, p1m, qm)) > 1− ε.
By the lower hemicontinuity of E ′, for each 1 ≤ h ≤ m, we can take a sequence
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(p0hn, p1hn, qhn) converging to (p0h, p1h, qh), with (p0hn, p1hn, qhn) ∈ E ′(γn, An).
Finally, for each n, take for ρn a probability measure supported by
{(p01n, p11n, q1n), ..., (p0mn, p1mn, qmn)} and such that
ρn((p0hn, p1hn, qhn)) ≥ ρ((p0h, p1h, qh)) for every 1 ≤ h ≤ m.
Since ε is arbitrarily small, we deduce the lower hemicontinuity of the correspon-
dence E ′′.
The three claims proved above allow us to apply the Michael selection theorem
and guarantee that there is a continuous selection in the correspondence E ′′, which
is the desired continuous random selection for the equilibrium correspondence E ′
and finally it is also the continuous random selection for the correspondence E.
¥
We are now in position to define the game played by the intermediaries in
the first stage of the model. We denote by Γh × Ah the strategy set for each
intermediary h = 1, ..., H, where Γh = [γ, γ]
Jh and Ah = AJh . The continu-
ous random selection of the equilibrium correspondence is the main device to
define a continuous payoff function for each intermediary as the profit expected
value. Given a profile of strategies for each intermediary (Ah, γh, A−h, γ−h) where
(Ah, γh) denotes the strategy of intermediary h, and (A−h, γ−h) denotes the strat-
egy of the remaining intermediaries, the payoff function for intermediary h will be:
pih : Γh ×Ah × Γ−h ×A−h −→ IR+
pih(γh, Ah, γ−h,A−h) =∫
∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1
[
Jh∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
(G(γj), (z
i
j)− ε(aj)zij − c(aj)) + wh]dρ(γ,A)
where ρ(γ,A) is the continuous random selection that the intermediaries expect
when they set the vector of spread parameters γ and design the asset matrix
A. The asset creation is then described by a simultaneous Nash game which is
characterized by G ≡ {(Γh ×Ah, pih);h ∈ H}
Definition 5. A pair (γ∗, A∗) ∈ ΓJ ×AJ is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium for
the asset design game G ≡ {(Γh ×Ah, pih);h ∈ H} if pih(γ∗h, A∗h, γ∗−h, A∗−h) =
= max
(γh,Ah)∈γh×Ah
pih(γh, Ah, γ
∗
−h, A
∗
−h) for all h = 1, ..., H.
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Proposition 3. There is a set U∗×W∗
LJˆ
residual in U × IRJˆ+ such that for every
economy {(ui)i∈I , (w1LJˆ , w−LJˆ), (uh, wh)h∈H)} with u1 ∈ U∗ and w1LJˆ ∈ W∗ the
associated asset design game G ≡ {(Γh × Ah, pih);h ∈ H} has equilibrium in
mixed strategies.
Proof: We have that conditions hold that are sufficient for the application
of Glicksberg’s existence theorem [see Fundenberg and Tirole [17]]. Namely, the
strategy sets are compact and the payoff functions of each player are continuous.
¥
3 Equilibrium and the Main Result
The equilibrium concept allows for the consistence between the two stages through
which the economy evolves.
Definition 6. An equilibrium for an economy E = {((ui, wi)i∈I , (uh, wh)h∈H)} is
a pair (σ, α) such that:
(i) σ is an equilibrium in mixed strategies for the associated asset design game,
G ≡ {(Γh×Ah, pih);h ∈ H} with σ = σ1×· · ·×σH and with σh being a probability
over Γh ×Ah;
(ii) α is a measure over the price set given by the Gelfand integral of the random
selection with respect to the measure σ, that is, α = ρ((Γ, A))dσ.
Remark that for a function g ∈ C(∆(L−1)S ×∆L+J−1) we have,∫
∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1
g d(ρ((Γ, A))dσ) =
∫
Γ×A
∫
∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1
g dρ((Γ, A))dσ
By words, we can say that the measure α is a price distribution which is the
expected value of the continuous random selection with respect to the mixed
strategies profile over vector of spread parameters and return matrices. This
measure α exists because ρ is continuous for the weak∗ topology in the range
space and therefore, Gelfand integrable.
Theorem 1. There is a set U∗ ×W∗
LJˆ
residual in U × IRJˆ+ such that for every
economy {(ui)i∈I , (w1LJˆ , w−LJˆ), (uh, wh)h∈H)} with u1 ∈ U∗ and w1LJˆ ∈ W∗LJˆ , the
equilibrium set is not empty.
Proof: The theorem follows from lemma 2 and proposition 10. ¥
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4 Asset Design with Incomplete Information:
Purification of Equilibria
In this section we show that for an appropriate economy with incomplete infor-
mation we can guarantee the existence of equilibrium in distributional strategies
and moreover, we guarantee the existence of approximate equilibrium in pure
strategies. The existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies fol-
lows from the Milgrom and Weber [28] theorem which asserts that for games in
which the informational variables of the players have atomless distributions, each
player’s set of pure strategies is dense in his complete set of strategies, that is, in
his set of distributional strategies.
The model in this context is similar to the previous model, namely, at the first
stage of the model the intermediaries behave strategically choosing the matrix of
asset market returns and the related vector of spread parameters. The interme-
diaries have rational expectations hence they correctly anticipate the equilibria
price set corresponding to each financial structure and therefore they can evalu-
ate the payoff associated to each financial structure. Then, we will consider as
before a model with two stages. In the first stage we define a game in spreads and
assets in a context of incomplete information. Using this incomplete information
framework we obtain the purification of the equilibrium by exploring the Milgrom
and Weber [28] results.
Each intermediary is characterized by an informational variable (or type) th,
which defines the fixed cost associated to asset design and trade. Let us address
the case of fixed cost functions given by, ch(a) = α1h+α2hM(a˜)+α3hV (a˜) where
a˜ = a/max
i
{ai} and M(a˜) and V (a˜), denote the mean and the variance (taking
up a uniform distribution on the states of nature) of the asset a˜, respectively.
The use of a˜ instead of a in the fixed cost definition assures that the assumption
(B.2) on costs holds. The independent term α1h represents the cost of locating
potential clients and the cost of setting up the business activity, the other term,
α2hM(a˜) + α3hV (a˜), represents the cost of designing and marketing the asset,
as a function of the mean and variance of its returns. Thus, the fixed cost
function of each intermediary, ch, is described by the vector of parameters αh =
(α1h, α2h, α3h) ∈ IR3+, that is ch = ch(αh), and the vector αh constitutes the
informational variable (or type), th = αh. The informational structure in the set
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of types is defined by a probability measure η on the Borel subsets of (IR3+)
H .
Associated with the informational structure η are the marginal distributions of
each intermediary, ηh. We state the following assumptions for the informational
structure:
(C.1) The informational variable th belongs to a compact set Th = T ⊂ IR3+ for
every h = 1, ..., H.
(C.2) The measure η is absolutely continuous with respect to the measure ηˆ =
η1 × · · · × ηH .
In this context, with incomplete information, the second stage of the model
proceeds exactly as the second stage of the previous model. The innovated secu-
rities and its related spreads are already fixed in the market, then, it is time to a
Walrasian auctionner to determine the equilibrium prices and allocations for the
economy. In fact, in the second stage of the model we can interpret the economy
as an economy with exogenous given financial markets structure. The equilib-
rium prices would be such that each consumer and each intermediary maximizes
utility. The problem is the same that we solved in section 2.1, therefore lemma 2
is suitable and it also holds that the excess demand function is a C1 function.
The main focus of this approach with incomplete information comes out in
the first stage of the model. The intermediaries design the asset market structure
through a game with incomplete information. The strategy space of each player-
intermediary, is the set Mh which denotes the set of probability measures over
the Borel sets of T × Γh ×Ah. Let M =M1 × . . .×MH .
Definition 7. A distributional strategy for player h is a probability measure µh,
such that its marginal distribution on T is the one specified by the information
structure, ηh. Precisely, this restriction on the marginal distributions means that
for all S ⊂ T , µh(S × Γh ×Ah) = ηh(S).
The payoff function of each intermediary stills being build up through the
equilibrium correspondence. However we need to consider another argument in
this correspondence. Let us denote by T˜ = TH the set of intermediaries informa-
tional variable, which is the same as the set of intermediaries fixed cost functions.
We denote by α = (α1, ..., αH) ⊂ T˜ a vector of parameters that define the fixed
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cost functions of the intermediaries. The equilibrium correspondence in this ap-
proach is the correspondence EI : T˜ ×ΓJ×AJ −→ ∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1 that applies
a vector of fixed cost functions parameters α = (α1, ..., αH) and an asset market
structure (γ,A) into the corresponding walrasian prices, that is,
EI(α, γ, A) = {(p0, p1, q) ∈ ∆(L−1)S ×∆L+J−1 : f(α, γ, A, p0, p1, q) = 0}
Following the same steps of the proof of the proposition 9, we can also prove
that the equilibrium correspondence EI contains a continuous random selection
ρ(α, γ, A). Then, the expected payoff to each player-intermediary is constructed
using the random selection in the same way of the previous section.
pih :M =M1 × . . .×MH −→ IR+
(µ1, ..., µH)→ pih(µ1, ..., µH) =
=
∫
(T×Γ1×A1)×···×(T×ΓH×AH)
∫
∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1
[
Jh∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
(G(γj)(z
i
j)− ε(aj)zij −
ch(αh)(aj)) + w
h]dρ(α,A, γ)dµ1 · · · dµH
Therefore, given a numeraire asset market economy with incomplete information
EI ≡ {((ui, wi)i∈I , (uh, (T, ηh))h∈H)}, the asset market arise as a solution of the
game GI ≡ {(Mh, pih), h ∈ H} characterized by the strategy set Mh and by the
payoff function pih, for each intermediary h = 1, ..., H.
Definition 8. A pure strategy for player h is a measurable function ah : T −→
Ah×Γh. That is, a pure strategy is a distributional strategy µh whose conditional
distributions µh(\t) are Dirac measures for each type t.
Definition 9. An ε-equilibrium point of a game is a n-tuple (µ1, ..., µn) of player’s
strategies, such that for every player i and every alternative strategy µ′i, pi((µ1, ..., µn))+
ε ≥ pi((µ1, ..., µ′i, ..., µn)).
Proposition 4. There is a set U∗×W∗
LJˆ
residual in U × IRJˆ+ such that for every
economy EI ≡ {((ui, wi)i∈I , (uh, (T, ηh))h∈H)} with u1 ∈ U∗ and w1LJˆ ∈ W∗LJˆ
the associated game GI ≡ {(Mh, pih), h ∈ H} has equilibrium in distributional
strategies. If in addiction the measure ηh is atomless for each h = 1, ..., H, then,
for every ε > 0 the game has an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: The payoffs, pih of the game GI are equicontinuous. For this, let
(αn, γn, An) be a sequence converging to (α, γ,A), then
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∫
∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1 [
∑Jh
j=1
∑I
i=1(G(γj)(z
i
j)− ε(aj)zij − ch(aj)) + wh]dρ(αn, An, γn)
converges to∫
∆(L−1)S×∆L+J−1 [
∑Jh
j=1
∑I
i=1(G(γj)(z
i
j)− ε(aj)zij − ch(aj)) + wh]dρ(α,A, γ),
[see E.4.1 (i)in Mas-Collel [26]]. Then the payoff function of each intermediary
is continuous. By assumption (C.1) the type set is compact then we obtain the
equicontinuity of payoffs [see Royden [31], chapter 9, problem 40] and the Arzela-
Ascoli theorem. By assumption (C.2) the game GI has absolutely continuous
information, thus, there exist a distributional strategy equilibrium for the game
GI [see Milgrom and Weber [28], theorem 1].
When ηh is atomless, the set of pure strategies is dense in the set of distribu-
tional strategies [see Milgrom and Weber [28], theorem 3], for each intermediary
h = 1, ..., H. This denseness property together with the continuity of the payoffs
allow us to conclude that there is a pure strategy profile arbitrarily near any
mixed strategy equilibrium which is therefore an ε-equilibrium. ¥
The concept of equilibrium for this economy with incomplete information
differs from the previous one precisely in the kind of strategy profile of the first
stage game, namely, in this economy with incomplete information the strategies
are distributional strategy instead of mixed strategies.
Definition 10. A pair (µ, ϕ) is a distributional equilibrium for an economy
EI ≡ {((ui, wi)i∈I , (uh, (T, ηh))h∈H)}, if:
(i) µ is an equilibrium profile in distributional strategies for the associated game
GI ≡ {(Mh, pih), h ∈ H} with µ = µ1 × · · · × µH .
(ii) ϕ is a measure over prices given by the Gelfand integral of the random
selection integrated with respect to the measure µ = µ1 × · · · × µH , that is,
ϕ = ρ(α,A, γ)dµ.
Theorem 2. There is a set U∗ ×W∗
LJˆ
residual in U × IRJˆ+ such that for every
economy EI ≡ {((ui, wi)i∈I , (uh, (T, ηh))h∈H)} with u1 ∈ U∗ and w1LJˆ ∈ W∗LJˆ , the
distributional equilibrium set is not empty and if in addition ηh (h = 1, ..., H) is
atomless, then, the economy has an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: The theorem follows from lemma 2 and proposition 17.
¥
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Appendix
Lemma 1. If assumptions A.1.−A.3. and B.1.−B.3. are satisfied, there exist a
Walrasian equilibrium for a given vector of spread parameters γ and for a given
asset return structure A.
Proof: Let us consider a truncated economy where commodity plans and
portfolios are restricted to lie in a closed cube K ⊆ IRL(S+1) × IRJ with center at
the origin. Since a separate budget constraint must be satisfied at every state
s and demand is homogenous of degree zero in spot prices, we may restrict our
attention to:
p = (. . . , p(s), . . .) ∈ ∆(L−1)S = ×s∈S∆L−1 with
∆L−1 = {p(s) ∈ IRL+ :
∑
l∈L
pl(s) = 1}
The homogeneity of degree zero, in prices, of the fist period budget constraint
allows us to choose (p0, q) ∈ ∆L+J−1 where
∆L+J−1 = {(p0, q) ∈ IRL+J+ :
L∑
l=1
p0l +
J∑
j=1
qj = 1}.
Now we construct a generalized game played by the I consumers and S + 1
auctioneers (one for the first period and one for each state of nature of the second
period):
(i) For each i, consumer i solves:
max
x∈IRn+,z∈IRJ
ui(x)
s.a. p0(x0 − wi0) + p01G(γ)(z) + qz = 0
ps(xs − wis) = p1sa(s)z for all (x, z) ∈ K.
(ii) The first period auctioneer solves:
max
p0,q
{p01
I∑
i=1
(xi01 −wi01) + p01
H∑
h=1
(xh −wh) + p01
J∑
j=1
[ε(aj)
I∑
i=1
zi+j + c(aj)] +
L∑
l=2
[p0l
I∑
i=1
(xi0l − wi0l)] + q
I∑
i=1
zi : (p0, q) ∈ ∆L+J−1}
but since xh =
Jh∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
[G(γj)(z
i
j) − ε(aj)z¯i+j − c(aj)] + wh, we can rewrite
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the problem:
max
p0,q
{p01
I∑
i=1
(xi01 − wi01) + p01
H∑
h=1
([
Jh∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
[G(γj)(z
i
j) − ε(aj)zi+j − c(aj)] +
wh]−wh)+p01
J∑
j=1
[ε(aj)(
I∑
i=1
zi+j)+c(aj)]+
L∑
l=2
[p0l
I∑
i=1
(xi0l−wi0l)]+q
I∑
i=1
zi :
(p0, q) ∈ ∆L+J−1} ⇐⇒
max
p0,q
{p01
I∑
i=1
(xi01−wi01)+p01
H∑
h=1
([
Jh∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
G(γj)(z
i
j)]+
L∑
l=2
[p0l
I∑
i=1
(xi0l−wi0l)]+
q
I∑
i=1
zi : (p0, q) ∈ ∆L+J−1} ⇐⇒
max
p0,q
{p01
I∑
i=1
(xi01−wi01)+p01
I∑
i=1
H∑
h=1
([
Jh∑
j=1
G(γj)(z
i
j)]+
L∑
l=2
[p0l
I∑
i=1
(xi0l−wi0l)]+
q
I∑
i=1
zi : (p0, q) ∈ ∆L+J−1} ⇐⇒
max
p0,q
{p01
I∑
i=1
(xi01 − wi01) + p01
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
G(γj)(z
i
j) +
L∑
l=2
[p0l
I∑
i=1
(xi0l − wi0l)] +
q
I∑
i=1
zi : (p0, q) ∈ ∆L+J−1} ⇐⇒
max
p0,q
{p01
I∑
i=1
(xi01+G(γ)(z
i)−wi01)+
L∑
l=2
[p0l
I∑
i=1
(xi0l−wi0l)]+q
I∑
i=1
zi : (p0, q) ∈
∆L+J−1}.
(iii) The second period auctioneers solves:
max
ps
{ps ·
I∑
i=1
(xis − wis) : ps ∈ ∆L−1}.
This generalized game satisfies the assumptions of Debreu on existence of
strategic equilibria. Let ((x¯, z¯), p¯0, p¯1, q¯) be a strategic equilibrium. The first
period budget constraint of each consumer implies,
p01
I∑
i=1
(xi01 +G(γ)(z
i)− wi01) +
L∑
l=2
[p0l
I∑
i=1
(xi0l − wi0l)] + q
I∑
i=1
zi ≤ 0.
Then, by (ii),
I∑
i=1
(x¯i01 + G(γ)(z¯
i) − wi01) ≤ 0 and
I∑
i=1
(x¯i0l − wi0l) ≤ 0, for all
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l = 2, ..., L. Therefore,
I∑
i=1
x¯i01 ≤
I∑
i=1
[wi01 − G(γ)(z¯i)]) ≤
I∑
i=1
wi01, since G(γ) >
0. Thus, in equilibrium, the consumption bundle of the first period satisfies,
I∑
i=1
x¯i01 ≤
I∑
i=1
wi01 and
I∑
i=1
x¯i0l ≤
I∑
i=1
wi0l, for all l = 2, ..., L.
By (ii) we also have
I∑
i=1
z¯i ≤ 0, implying, As
I∑
i=1
z¯i ≤ 0. Then, ps ·
I∑
i=1
(x¯is −
wis) ≤ 0, for each s, and, therefore, by (iii),
I∑
i=1
(x¯is − wis) ≤ 0, for each s. The
equilibrium consumption bundle of the second period satisfies
I∑
i=1
x¯is ≤
I∑
i=1
wis,
for all s ∈ S.
Now, consider a sequence of increasing closed cubes Kn whose centers are the
origin and let (x¯n, z¯n, p¯n0 , p¯
n
1 , q¯
n) be a respective sequence of strategic equilibria
for the associated truncated generalized games. Notice that x¯n ∈
[
0,
I∑
i=1
wi
]
,
p¯n1 ∈ ∆(L−1)S and (p¯n0 , q¯n) ∈ ∆L+J−1 and therefore there exists a converging sub-
sequence (x¯, p¯0, p¯1, q¯)
nq whose limit is, say, (x˜, p˜0, p˜1, q˜) ∈
[
0,
I∑
i=1
wi
]
×∆(L−1)S ×
∆L+J−1.
If p˜1s > 0 for all s, then by the first order necessary and sufficient conditions
for the consumer problem we obtain z˜i. Now, z˜i = lim
nq
z¯nq (by continuity of the
first order conditions) and all other budget constraints will be satisfied, together
with the inequalities
I∑
i=1
(x˜i01 + G(γ)(z˜
i) − wi01) ≤ 0,
I∑
i=1
(x˜i0l − wi0l) ≤ 0, for all
l = 2, ..., L,
I∑
i=1
(x˜is − wis) ≤ 0 for all s and
I∑
i=1
z˜i ≤ 0 .
Now we prove that (x˜i, z˜i) is an optimal choice for consumer i at prices
(p˜0, p˜1, q˜). Suppose it were not, say (xˆ
i, zˆi) is budget feasible at (p˜0, p˜1, q˜) and
ui(xˆi) > ui(x˜i). For n large enough, (x˜i, z˜i) ∈ intKn and for λ sufficiently close
to zero we have λ(xˆi, zˆi) + (1 − λ)(x˜i, z˜i) belonging to Kn, budget feasible at
(p˜0, p˜1, q˜) and such that u
i(λxˆi + (1 − λ)x˜i) > ui(x˜i). By continuity of prefer-
ences, (λxˆi+(1−λ)x¯inq , λzˆi+(1−λ)z¯inq) would be chosen instead of (x¯inq , z¯inq),
in the truncated economy Kn, at prices (p¯
nq
0 , p¯
nq
1 , q¯
nq), a contradiction.
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Let us now prove that
I∑
i=1
z˜i = 0,
I∑
i=1
(x˜i01 + G(γ)(z˜
i) − wi01) = 0,
I∑
i=1
(x˜i0l −
wi0l) = 0, for all l = 2, ..., L and
I∑
i=1
(x˜is − wis) = 0 for all s.
The first order conditions of the optimization problem of the period-0 auction-
eer imply that
I∑
i=1
zi = β =
I∑
i=1
(xi01+G(γ)(z
i)−wi01) =
I∑
i=1
(xi0l−wi0l), for any l,
where β is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
L∑
l=1
p0l +
J∑
j=1
qj = 1. Then,
by Walras’ law, p01
I∑
i=1
(xi01+G(γ)(z
i)−wi01)+
L∑
l=1
[p0l
I∑
i=1
(xi0l−wi0l)]+ q ·
I∑
i=1
zi =
p01β+
L∑
l=1
[p0lβ]+q ·β = 0, that is, β[
L∑
l=1
p0l+
J∑
j=1
qj] = 1. But
L∑
l=1
p0l+
J∑
j=1
qj = 1
which implies β = 0 and therefore there is no free disposal. Finally, since∑I
i=1 z˜
i = 0, then by budget constraint ps ·
I∑
i=1
(x˜is − wis) = 0, and we have
no free disposal as well.
It remains to check that p˜1s 6= 0 for any s. Suppose p˜1s = 0 for some s. Let e1s
be a canonical vector, in the direction of this commodity. By the monotonicity
assumption, ui(x˜i + ke1s) > u
i(x˜i), for k > 0. Let k = min
l
wisl, then, for n large
enough, ui((1− p¯nq1sn)x˜i+ke1s) > ui(x˜inq). But it is easily seen that the consumer
can afford the bundle on the left hand side (at prices (p¯
nq
0 , p¯
nq
1 , q¯
nq)), by choosing
the portfolio (1 − p¯1s)nq z¯inq . This contradicts the fact that (x¯, z¯, p¯0, p¯1, q¯)nq is a
free disposal equilibrium for the truncated economy with cube Knq .
¥
Lemma 2. If (A.1) − (A.3) and (B.1) − (B.3) are satisfied, individual demand
is a C1 function.
Proof: Let us denote by x0 the consumers consumption vector of the first
period and by x1 the consumers consumption vector of the second period. Let us
fix ps1 = 1, for any s. The first order necessary and sufficient conditions for the
consumer problem are:
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D0u
i − µp0 = 0
Dsu
i − λsps = 0, s = 1, ..., S
−ps · (xs − wis) + Asz = 0, s = 1, ..., S
λ′A− µ[q +DzG] = 0
−p0(x0 − wi0)− q.z − p01G(z) = 0
Let J be the SL · S matrix where the sth column is (0...0p′s0...0)).The Jacobian
matrix with the second order derivatives(with respect to (x0, x1, λ, z, µ) is:
J =

D20u
i 0 0 0 −p0
0 D21u
i −p1 0 0
0 −p′1 0 A 0
0 0 A′ −µD2z −q −DzG
−p0 0 0 −q′ −D′zG 0

It is easy to observe that the matrix J is non-singular. In fact, let y = (xˆ0, xˆ1, λˆ, zˆ, µˆ)
such that Jy = 0, then y′Jy = 0 (which using Jy = 0) reduces to xˆ′0(D
2
0u
i)xˆ0 +
xˆ′1(D
2
1u
i)xˆ1 − zˆ′(µD2zG)zˆ. Notice that this last equality can be written as
[
xˆ′0 xˆ
′
1 zˆ
]
D20u
i 0 0
0 D21u
i 0
0 0 −µD2zG


xˆ0
xˆ1
zˆ

which implies xˆ0 = 0, xˆ1 = 0 and zˆ = 0 by negative definiteness of D
2ui and
µD2zG. Then, back to Jy = 0, we get λˆ = 0. Finally again with Jy = 0, µˆ = 0.
Therefore by the implicit function theorem we conclude that individual excess
demand is a C1 function. ¥
Proposition 1. There is a set U∗ ×W∗
LJˆ
residual in U × IRJˆ+ such that for an
economy {(ui)i∈I , (w1LJˆ , w1−LJˆ), (uh, wh)h∈H , γ, A} with u1 ∈ U∗, w1LJˆ ∈ W∗LJˆ and
with an exogenous vector of spread parameters γ ∈ ΓJ and an exogenous asset
market given by the payoff matrix A ∈ AJ the number of critical equilibria for
the economy is at most nI + SJ + J .
The proof requires some notation and a preparatory Lemma.
Let G be a closed ball in ΓJ with rational center and rational coordinates
and let M be a closed ball in AJ with rational center and rational coordinates.
Let B × D = {B1 × D1, . . . , BnI+SJ+J × DnI+SJ+J} be a collection of disjoint
23
closed balls in ∆(L−1)S × ∆L+J−1, each Bi × Di having rational radius and a
center with rational first (L − 1)(S + 1) + J coordinates. Now, for every B and
positive integer m put KB,m = {w ∈ RL(1+S−Jˆ)+(L−1)Jˆ+n(I−1)+ : (1/m) ≤ pj · wi ≤
m, for all j, i and for all pj ∈ Bj}. There is a countable number of product sets
KB,m ×G×M ×B ×D.
For every u1 ∈ U and every w1LJˆ define
F(u1,w1
LJˆ
) : KB,m ×G×M ×B ×D → R((L−1)(S+1)+Jˆ)(nI+SJ+J+1)
with F j
(u1,w1
LJˆ
)
(w−LJˆ , γ, A, (p
1
0, p
1
1, q
1), . . . , (pnI+SJ+J+10 , p
nI+SJ+J+1
1 , q
nI+SJ+J+1)),
j = 1, . . . , nI + SJ + J + 1, defined as follows: the first (L − 1)(S + 1) co-
ordinates comprise the aggregate excess demand function for the first L − 1
commodities on period 1 and for the first L − 1 commodities on each state
of period 2, the last Jˆ components of this function consist of aggregate de-
mand for assets 1 to J summed up in the compound portfolio zˆ = zˆ1 + Bzˆ2.
These commodities and portfolio demand are those generated by the economy
{(ui)i∈I , (w1LJˆ , w1−LJˆ), (uh, wh)h∈H , γ, A} at the price vector (p
j
0, p
j
1, q
j).
Lemma 3. There is an open and dense subset U ′×W ′
LJˆ
⊂ U ×RJˆ+ such that for
every element u1 belonging to U ′ and every w1LJˆ belonging to W ′LJˆ , 0 is a regular
value of F(u1,w1
LJˆ
).
Proof: Openness follows from continuity of the determinant function and
compactness of the sets KB,m×G×M ×B ×D (because F(u1,w1
LJˆ
) turns into an
open map). So we only need to concern about density, that is, given (u1, w
1
LJˆ
)
we have to show that there exists (u′1, w
′1
LJˆ
) arbitrarily near from (u1, w
1
LJˆ
) such
that 0 is a regular value of F(u′1,w′1LJˆ )
.
Let G′ such that G′ ⊂ intG. Let M ′ such that M ′ ⊂ intM . Let B′ ×D′ be
a collection (in the countable family) with B′j ×D′j ⊂ intBj × intDj for every
j. Let also αj : Γ × A × ∆(L−1)S × ∆L+J−1 × RS+1 → [0, 1] be a C∞ function
satisfying αj(G
′ ×M ′ ×B′j ×D′j × [1/m,m]S+1) = 1 and
αj(Γ×A×∆(L−1)S ×∆L+J−1 ×R\G×M ×Bj ×Dj × [2/m, 2m]S+1) = 0 Now
fix ε > 0 and let v : Γ × A × ∆(L−1)S × ∆L+J−1 × RS+1 → R be the indirect
utility function associated with u1. For every j denote by Yj ⊂ R(S+1)(L−1) and
by T j ⊂ RJˆ the corresponding unit balls. Then for every (y, t) ∈ Y1 × . . . ×
YnI+SJ+J+1 × T 1 × . . .× T nI+SJ+J+1, we define
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v(y, t)(γ,A, p0, p1, q, N) = v(γ,A, p0, p1, q, Nt)+
ε
nI+SJ+J+1∑
j=1
αj(γ,A, p0, p1, q, N)y
j · (p0, p1)
where N = (p0, p1) · (w10, w11) and
Nt = N + ε
nI+SJ+J+1∑
j=1
αj(γ,A, p0, p1, q, N)
Jˆ∑
k=1
pkLt
j
k.
Notice that, by Cass trick [ Geanakoplos [18] or Magill and Shafer[25]] we
can consider, without loss of generality, that first consumer’s problem is a so-
lution of a problem with complete markets. Thus, by duality theory (see, for
example, Diewert (1982)), we obtain that if ε is sufficiently small, then for all
(y, t), v(y,t) : Γ × A × ∆(L−1)S × ∆L+J−1 × RS+1 → R satisfies all the properties
of an indirect utility function. If uy1 is the corresponding direct utility func-
tion, then by taking ε arbitrarily small, uy1 is the perturbed utility function and
w1t = w
1
LJˆ
+ ε
∑nI+SJ+J+1
j=1 αj(γ,A, p0, p1, q, N)t
j is the corresponding initial en-
dowment that we are looking for. Thus, the lemma is proved if we show that
for any ε > 0, there exists (y, t) such that F(uy1 ,w1t ) is transverse to 0. In order to
obtain the result, we define
F : KB,m×G×M×(Bk×Dk×Yk×T k)k=nI+SJ+J+1k=1 → R(nI+SJ+J+1)((L−1)(S+1)+Jˆ)
by, F j(w, γ,A, (p10, p
1
1, q
1), . . . , (pnI+SJ+J+10 , such that as before, the first (L −
1)(S+1) coordinates comprise the aggregate excess demand function for the first
L−1 commodities on period 1 and for the first L−1 commodities on each state of
period 2 and the last Jˆ components of this function consist of aggregate demand
for assets summed up in the compound portfolio zˆ = zˆ1 + Bzˆ2. We are taking
up the demand generated by the perturbed economy (uy1, w
1
t ), at the price vector
(pj0, p
j
1, q
j). To obtain the result let us show that rank
D(y,t)F (w¯, γ¯, A¯, (p¯
1
0, p¯
1
1, q¯
1), . . . , (p¯nI+SJ+J+10 , p¯
nI+SJ+J+1
1 , q¯
nI+SJ+J+1), y¯, t¯)
= (nI + SJ + J + 1)((L− 1)(S + 1) + Jˆ)
whenever F (w¯, γ¯, A¯, (p¯10, p¯
1
1, q¯
1), . . . , (p¯nI+SJ+J+10 , p¯
nI+SJ+J+1
1 , q¯
nI+SJ+J+1), y¯, t¯) =
0. Thus, by Transversality Theorem [see Guillemin and Pollack (1994)], one ver-
ifies that for almost all y, 0 is a regular value of Fuy1 . Note that by construction
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D(y,t)F (w¯, γ¯, A¯, (p¯
1
0, p¯
1
1, q¯
1), . . . , (p¯nI+SJ+J+10 , p¯
nI+SJ+J+1
1 , q¯
nI+SJ+J+1), y¯, t¯) is diag-
onal (i.e., D(yj′ ,tj′′)F
j = 0 for every j 6= j′, j′′), therefore, it suffices to show that
the rank of the matrix
D(y,t)F
j(w¯, γ¯, A¯, (p¯10, p¯
1
1, q¯
1), . . . , (p¯nI+SJ+J+10 , p¯
nI+SJ+J+1
1 , q¯
nI+SJ+J+1), y¯, t¯)
is ((L− 1)(S + 1) + Jˆ).
To calculate this rank, remember that (yj, tj) enters into F j only via the
excess demand for the first consumer. Moreover, taking into account the Cass
trick [see Geanakoplos (1990) or Magill and Shafer (1991)] the demand of first
consumer can be computed as argmax
x
{u1(x) : x ∈ B1(p˜0, p˜1)} with
B1(p˜0, p˜1)} = {x ∈ RL(S+1) : p˜0x0 + p˜1x1 ≤ p˜0w10 + p˜1w11}, where (p˜0, p˜1)
is equal to (p0, p1) rescaled, that is, the demand of the first consumer is a solution
of a problem with complete markets, so we can apply the Roy’ formula. Then
the excess demand for commodities of the first consumer is given by
−[ 1
Dwvy(p¯
j
0, p¯
j
1, p¯
j
0w¯
1
0 + p¯
j
1w¯
1
1)
]D(p0,p1)vy(p¯
j
0, p¯
j
1, p¯
j
0w¯
1
0 + p¯
j
1w¯
1
1)− w¯0 − w¯1.
Notice that Dwvy(p¯
j
0, p¯
j
1, p¯
j
0w¯
1
0+ p¯
j
1w¯
1
1) does not depend on z
j and by definition
of vy we have that
D(p0,p1)vy(p¯
j
0, p¯
j
1, p¯
j
0w¯
1
0 + p¯
j
1w¯
1
1) = D(p0,p1)v(p¯
j
0, p¯
j
1, p¯
j
0w¯
1
0 + p¯
j
1w¯
1
1) + εy
j, a linear
map on yj.
By inversion of a Cramer subsystem of budget equations for consumer 1 we
can obtain that the compound portfolio of assets for this consumer 1 is given by
zˆ1 = Aˆ′−1[ps · (xs − w1s)]Ss=1,
Where Aˆ′ is a non-singular Jˆ × Jˆ submatrix of Aˆ. Since Aˆ is in general position,
any Jˆ × Jˆ submatrix of Aˆ is non-singular and to simplify let us take the matrix
formed by the first Jˆ rows. Then the compound portfolio demand zˆ is a linear
map on the demand for commodities. So, the compound portfolio demand zˆ is
also a linear map on yj.
Now, we can write D(yj ,tj)F
j as follows:
D(y,t)F
j =

F11 ... F12
. . . . . .
F21 ... F22
 where
F11 = ∂x
1
∂yj
, F12 = ∂x
1
∂tj
, F21 = ∂z˜
1
∂yj
, F22 = ∂z˜
1
∂tj
.
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Note that |D(y,t)F j| = |F11| · |F22 −F21 · F−111 · F12|.
By the Roy’s formula above, F11 = εI, where I is the unit matrix of order
(S + 1)(L− 1).
On the other hand, the line k of the matrix F22 and the line k of the matrix
F21 are defined as follows:
(F22)k = (Aˆ′−1)k
(∑
l
psl
∂x1sl
∂tjk
)J ′
s=1
− ε(Aˆ′−1)k
(F21)k = (Aˆ′−1)k
(∑
l
psl
∂x1sl
∂yjk
)J ′
s=1
Then, the determinant of D(yj ,tj)F
j is given by
|D(yj ,tj)F j| = ε
∣∣∣(Aˆ′−1)(∑
l
psl
∂x1
∂tj
)
− ε(Aˆ′−1)− ε−1Aˆ′−1
(∑
l
psl
∂x1
∂yj
) ∂x
∂tj
∣∣∣.
Summing up, we obtain that |D(yj ,tj)F j| = −ε2|Aˆ′−1|. Since, Aˆ′−1 is a non-
singular matrix, the determinant of D(yj ,tj)F
j is non-null. Finally, D(yj ,tj)F
j has
rank (L− 1)(S + 1) + Jˆ . ¥
Proof: (Proof of Proposition 1.) By lemma 3 we know that there is an
open and dense set U ′×W ′
LJˆ
⊂ U ×RJˆ+ such that for every (u1, w1LJˆ) ∈ U ′×W ′LJˆ ,
0 is a regular value of F(u1,w1
LJˆ
). Consider the intersection U∗ ×W∗LJˆ of the sets
U ′ ×W ′
LJˆ
obtained as we run over all the different G, M , B × D and m. This
set is clearly residual. Suppose now that for some u1 ∈ U∗, w¯1LJˆ ∈ RnI with
w¯1
LJˆ
∈ W∗
LJˆ
, γ ∈ Γ and A¯ ∈ A we have nI + SJ + J + 1 critical equilibria,
(p¯10, p¯
1
1, q¯
1), . . . , (p¯nI+SJ+J+10 , p¯
nI+SJ+J+1
1 , q¯
nI+SJ+J+1). Consider γ such that γ ∈
G, consider M such that A ∈M , B ×D and m such that each Bj ×Dj contains
(p¯0
j, p¯1
j, q¯j) in its interior and w¯−LJˆ belongs to KB,m. Now let Fu1,w1
LJˆ
defined on
this G, M , B ×D and KB,m. We have that rank of DγF(u1,w1
LJˆ
) can be at most
J , the rank of DAF(u1,w1
LJˆ
) can be at most SJ , the rank of DwF(u1,w1
LJˆ
) can be at
most nI, and by assumption for every j we have
rank D(p0,p1,q)F
j
(u1,w1LJ )
((p¯10, p¯
1
1, q¯
1), . . . , (p¯nI+SJ+J+10 , p¯
nI+SJ+J+1
1 , q¯
nI+SJ+J+1))
≤ (L− 1)(S + 1) + Jˆ − 1.
So, we can conclude that the rank of DF(u1,w1
LJˆ
) can at most be
(nI + SJ + J + 1)((L− 1)(S + 1) + Jˆ − 1) + nI + J + SJ =
(nI + SJ + J + 1)((L− 1)(S + 1) + Jˆ)− nI − SJ − J − 1 + nI + J + SJ =
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(nI + SJ + J + 1)((L− 1)(S + 1) + Jˆ)− 1
But 0 being a regular value of F(u1,w1
LJˆ
), requires that rank DF
j
(u1,w1
LJˆ
)
= (nI +
SJ + J + 1)((L− 1)(S + 1) + Jˆ).
Thus, if there are at least nI + SJ + J + 1 critical equilibria, then, 0 is not a
regular value of F(u1,w1
LJˆ
). But since
F(u1,w1
LJˆ
)((p¯
1
0, p¯
1
1, q¯
1), . . . , (p¯nI+SJ+J+10 , p¯
nI+SJ+J+1
1 , q¯
nI+SJ+J+1)) = 0
this is in contradiction with the lemma 3. ¥
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